23 April 2019
The
last three years have been a disagreeable voyage of discovery, leaving the
nation sadder and wiser, in particular as to the failings of half-hearted
negotiation. To repeat my
last post, our diplomats set no test
for the EU’s goodwill; never raised the stakes by walking out; rolled over for
the EU’s sequencing and its separation of the Withdrawal Agreement from
subsequent relations; did nothing to counter the principle and unconditionality
of payments; neglected to make their case directly to EU member-states,
industry or citizens - or to the world at large; and failed to prep the UK
public or make adequate provision for failed negotiations. (Please forgive the self-serving comment, but all of these matters were flagged up well ahead of time, here
and here.)
-o-
So
we’re left with a pig in a poke: a negotiation outcome which offers five ways to
kybosh the Brexit for which a majority voted three years ago
- The
Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration are passed by Parliament as they
stand. This ensures that the apparatus of treaty obligations, domestic and
foreign courts indefinitely prevents the arms-length relations with the EU which
would make for regulatory and trade independence.
This seems unlikely, as the Commons has declined to accept
it three times and the Speaker has said he will not permit the question to be
put again. His prohibition could be overcome if a new session of Parliament
were called, but this is probably off the cards as further inflaming Tory
opinion.
- The
Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration are passed by Parliament,
after adjustments in the latter to please Labour. This would further weaken an
already insipid settlement.
This also seems unlikely, as talks are reported to be
failing to make progress and Corbyn is hamstrung by the “Peoples’“ or
“Confirmatory Vote” camp in his own party, intended to dish Brexit without
accepting Parliamentary responsibility.
- The
Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration are passed by Parliament,
after adjustments in the latter to reflect Commons sentiment in “indicative
votes”. As previously, this further weakens the settlement.
This is May’s last desperate throw. It is impossible to
predict how the Commons might vote but May’s career could well be truncated
before she gets a chance to find out - see below.
- A
referendum takes place, in which the alternatives are (a) Revocation and (b)
the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration - either as at present or as
amended.
This is what much of the Labour Party would prefer, but
their leader is unconvinced and they lack the votes in the current Commons to
push it through.
- Revocation
is formally enacted, with or without a referendum.
Many in the Commons might prefer this but dare not vote for it given the referendum outcome and the manifestos on which they campaigned in 2017. This means it could only occur after a new general election in which the
winning party campaigned explicitly for it.
So
five separate ways to dish Brexit, jointly or severally supported by the Prime
Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, most political parties, a majority of
MPs and the Lords, and much of the media, academia, industry and finance. They
are not however, supported by the Cabinet, Commons or local Tories, or the
country. Even collectively they still seem unlikely.
-o-
But
as best I understand it, the nation faces just one narrow path by which it might
achieve what most would recognise as Brexit.
- The
Tories find a way to defenestrate May in short order – certainly by the summer.
The ’22 and local associations are currently working away at
this. At time of writing, the chances look less than 50%, but May’s opponents
have come back from the Easter recess with the wind in their sails. Shortly we
will see if grassroots fury can melt the superglue fastening May to the Number
Ten railings.
- The
Tories choose a leader who can win an election, running on a platform that the
outcome of negotiations - that is the Withdrawal Agreement and Political
Declaration (characterised for campaigning purposes as “Barnier’s deal”) - fails
to deliver the referendum.
Boris Johnson is the name that comes up, despite becoming a
Marmite figure over the last three years: he remains the most generally
attractive potential Tory leader but has come also to repel many.
- The
Tories win the election with a working majority.
This is the most problematic contingency. Two years ago, May
failed at the ballot-box and she has conspicuously failed since. The Tory brand
cannot but be contaminated by this, obliging a new leader to run against the
record of the party, never a good look at the hustings and explaining why the
Tories may plump for Marmite.
- The
new Government repeals or finds another way to overcome the Cooper-Letwin Act which seeks to prohibit “no deal”; and allows
the balance of the Article 50 extension to expire, making domestic and
international arrangements accordingly.
If a new Government has the votes and inclination, this can
happen. If not, not.
So
four separate contingencies, the third of which in particular looks like a real
stretch.
-o-
My
sense is that we are moving towards a general election in which the Tories
rally to Leave and Labour to Remain. Both call for a change of leadership direction
- probably of leader. The Tories seem to be heading that way, but I can’t see
Labour doing so without an election defeat. And they may win, in which case Brexit will join the general chaos in prospect. It all depends on
the next Tory leader who, heaven knows, will have a steep hill to climb. It
might just be done.